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1 If we take seriously the idea that democracy is not only a political regime but also a way
of life, in another sense, if we admit, as Lefort (1986) puts it, quoting Strauss, that politeia
means “regime” in the sense of a form of government and more profoundly and widely in
the sense of  a  form of  life,  as  rendered by the expression “Ancien Regime” for pre-
revolutionary France, then we cannot agree to the usual a priori divide between “the
social” and “the political” spheres.
2 The distinction between morals and manners (and the loss of the unity of the ancient
“mores”) is a form of this more general dichotomy between the social world of practices,
and the political  (or moral)  world of  principles,  that a pragmatist  approach helps to
overcome (Putnam 2004). Following Dewey’s important stance according to which ideas
and practices are organically related and, whilst they can be analytically distinguished as
steps in a process, are never more than aspects or moments in a continuous and dynamic
phenomenon (1938, French translation 2006: 598), I shall make the case for a study of
political principles as they appear and they are put into play, expressed, fought for, in
urban civil interactions.
3 Civility will be considered here as: a part of public life, a part of the everyday experience
of citizenship, an on-going activity, as opposed to a set of pre-defined superficial social
rules that one should only have to apply, that is, without ever really thinking about their
meaning or legitimacy, but rather “blindly” or even without thinking at all. Considering
civility as an active part of practicing democracy as a way of living together in a political
community will, therefore, require us to admit at least three ideas, which I shall attempt
to defend:
1. Civility  does  not  embody  ‘the  social’  as  opposed  to  ‘the  political.’  Rather,  it  navigates
between  these  two  polarities  of  the  public, between  a  notion  of  the  public,  that  can  be
considered  as  representing  the  potential  tyranny  of  the  second  person  and  an  opposite
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conception, referring to what is commonly considered to be the mark of the political, that is,
action, going along with the emergence of an autonomous first person before others (Arendt
1983) committed to what they care about, and trying to defend what they think is right,
true, and worthy. To conceive the connection between these two polarities of the public, one
has to acknowledge that what is  political  cannot be reduced to the model of  ‘action’  or
‘militancy.’  Rather,  politics  should  be  seen  as  going  its  own  way  through  culture  and
experience. Its analysis should therefore focus upon temporality, rather than topography
(seeking the places where politics happen). Taking civil interactions as a starting point helps
consider it to be utterly processual, rather than only eventful.
2. Civility is never a mere performing of rules and habits. It is also an ongoing work on (and not
only within or under) the rules of civility and their legitimacy, that is: how and why they
should be understood, applied and hierarchized. Therefore, customs and rules have to pass
the test  of  principles,  such as  equality,  liberty,  fraternity,  justice.  The tensions between
them continuously appear in everyday interactions and have to be dealt with as practical
issues.  Paying  attention  to  what  is  situationally  right,  it  is  misleading  to  describe  civil
practices and conduct as being either on the right or on the wrong side of the rule. Such a
spatial and binary apprehension of rules and of civility must therefore be criticized and
overcome.
3. In civil interactions, ordinary categorization should not be considered merely as a resource,
but  also  as  a  theme  (Zimmerman  &  Pollner  1970)  for  critique  and  even  contention,
contributing to forming the citizen’s perception and opinion of and about the world they
live  in.  This  is  one  of  the  ways  through  which  civil  activity  contributes  to  democracy:
participating in the constitution of the ‘Public Opinion,’ in the Kantian or Arendtian noble
sense of the term. Public debates and the media are often considered to be the two major
producers of public opinion (along with “private” sources and families). But they are not the
only forces which form and inform opinion. Such agencies of data production, that is, urban
interaction experiences, are for sure less easy to compose and study. Yet they are no less
real. They are probably one of the major sets of data in which perception of others and of
what can be done with and among them is forged and tested.
4 Each one of these three ideas will be attended to in the following.
 
Civility and the Two Dimensions of ‘the Public.’ The
Public Dimension in/of Civil Encounters
5 Civil  interactions are encounters  in public  in which individuals  experience others  as
strangers, are exposed to the gaze of others upon them, and the judgements that go with
this experience. This quality of publicity as exposure to anonymous others and to their
possible judgement, as well as to the risks that such surveillance encompasses, has often
been described as  representing a  possible  obstacle  to  individual  freedom.  This  social
dimension of  the ‘publicity’  of  urban life,  of  the interaction order notably,  has  been
particularly closely analysed by Goffman (1959; 1963; 1971). Quoting Sartre among others,
he insists upon the quality of threat that goes along with the public condition of social life,
the weight that bears upon one’s shoulders as soon as one knows that others are staring.
This condition is  what makes “impression management” (Goffman 1959:  chapter 6)  a
central part of urban life, and urban dwellers ultimately ”performers” (Goffman 1959) in
public settings.
6 Such a dimension has even been considered and described as the quintessence of the
social condition, and more even of urban life, as an exemplary form of modern social life,
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with its decline of traditional sociability and of solid durable ties. Of course, in contrast,
the “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) has been argued for, from Simmel (1950)
to Lofland (1998). Yet the importance and the relevance of such public sociability, as far
as  the  vitality  of  a  political  community  is  concerned,  seems  to  have  been  far  less
acknowledged.
7 Many contemporary theories of civility consider such public sociability as representing a
set  of  rules  and  constraints  that  are  typical  of  the  social  realm.  Hence,  they  are
considered superficial, relying upon appearances and conventions, as opposed to what is
real and authentic both morally (which is to be found behind appearances,1 these latter
being on the contrary, caught up in manners and forms) and politically, that is, the realm
of freedom, public debate, and action. In this opposition, the constitution of enlightened
opinions requires that citizens be detached from their ordinary selfish embodied short-
sighted preoccupations – that is, their existence as social beings. The political is then
understood as having to be forged apart from, and against the social,  as a gesture of
irruption, pulling-out/pulling off.
8 Most  contemporary  debates  concerning  civility  (Tassin  &  Murard  2006;  Boltanski  &
Esquerré 2014; Habib & Raynaud 2012) seem to be stuck in a binary opposition that has
much to do with this dichotomy between a conventional, artificial, passively inherited
‘social’ on the one hand, which free political action should escape from, and an irruptive
gesture characterizing real action, with its decisive capacity for renewal, on the other.
This binary vision opposes two notions of the public.2 The first can be called Goffmanian
(Goffman 1959; 1963; 1971), and the other Arendtian (Arendt 1983). The first is all about
what the others expect from us. It is a theatrical, dramaturgical model of the public, made
up  of  social  customs,  the  culture  understood  as  an  inherited  tradition  stuffed  with
constraints and more or less ill-founded authority, and reproduced through a mixture of
routine  and  fear  of  the  judgement  of  others.  Success  there  relies  upon “impression
management” (Goffman 1959). This social gangue embodies what I call here a ‘tyranny of
the second person,’ that is, the anticipation of what you think prevails in (and potentially
determines) the way that I behave.
9 As political philosophy understands it, the public domain, the domain of free action, is at
the opposite side of this duality: the public then represents the conditions through which
emerge the action of an I, who appears and exposes herself among others. It is then the
reign of ‘the first person.’ In such a binary opposition, genuine, true political action has
nothing to do with customs or habits. It must, on the contrary, tear the veil of the social
to appear in its political newness.
10 In this dual opposition, civility is ordinarily positioned without discussion and even as a
textbook case on the side of rituals and formal ceremonies (as opposed to ‘substantial’
ones: see Goffman 1959). It is said, after all, to represent the paradigmatic example of
‘social rules’ or ‘social conventions.’ Indeed, if we make “impression management” the
centre  of  civil  exchange,  then we cannot  disagree  that  it  mainly  deals  with what  is
expected from us, not what we think is good, fair, or true, that is, the ways things are, not
the way they should be. These latter values are said to be sought for elsewhere, not at the
surface of  things and conducts.  According to this  perspective,  routines,  appearances,
social niceties represent the social as a threat to what is really of value.
11 But it can alternatively be theorized and shown that civil interactions are, in fact, a way
through which people deal with those two dimensions of public life and publicity. They do
care and work hard for the sake of appearances, and therefore do fall under the control of
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others. But they also, at the same time, show great concern for what is true, fair, what
should be promoted or  what  should be allowed to happen,  what  should be possible,
normal, or unacceptable in the world they live in, and sometimes feel responsible for. In
some situations, being a spectator goes along with responsibility. Attending a situation
sometimes goes along with a minimal sense of being responsible for what happens before
one’s eyes. In public settings, definitions of the perimeter of such a responsibility are
forged and tested all the time, and they should be considered part of public life in a broad
political way. Civil interactions, therefore, will be, in this view, considered as the activity
of defining, between strangers in public, what people owe one another, can expect from
one  another,  and  can  do  together.  Civility  should,  therefore,  be  regarded  as a  way
through which people deal with the essential hybridity, the temporal, processual, and
‘impure’ quality of their political (and moral) life.
12 I will discuss civility and its difficulties later, for some of them have much to do with this
tension, and apparent dichotomy, between two notions, actually, two dimensions, of the
public, that is, the reign of customs, manners, and appearances, on the one hand, and the
realm of action, expression, and truth, on the other.
 
Civility Beyond the Admitted Evidence and Facility of a
Rule-Patterned Activity
13 Civil interactions display a sense of the public that is very profoundly linked to what a
democracy is, that is, a way of trying to define, but never from scratch, the best way to live
together as a political community. It always happens in a world that is already there, the
constraints  and demands of  which weigh upon us.  There are rules and expectations,
partly  inherited.  People  try  at  the  same  time  to  prove  competent  as  performers  in
practicing these rules, and to change how they are understood and performed, how they
are hierarchized, and even, of course, their very existence.
14 The two assertions according to which civility is a part of public life, in the noble sense of
the term, and more than a mere list of superficial codes, are deeply intertwined. This is so
because performing civility is never just a matter of applying rules, “maintaining normal
appearances” (Goffman) or: “doing being ordinary” (Sacks 1985)3. It also, often, deals with
trying to promote what is fair. These two aspects may sometimes go accordingly, but they
sometimes enter into tension and compete.
15 The current  doxa about  civility,  derived  from Goffman,  is  that  civility  works  mainly
because it is simple, impersonal, costs little, and does not mean much (Goffman 1971).
Hence, of course, as far as public encounters are concerned, in cases of disagreement
people always prefer to overlook and walk away than to discuss over what is true or fair.
What allows and requires us to overcome this reductive functionalist perspective in civil
exchange is a discovery from ethnographic fieldwork4. People do care enough to quarrel
and fight, quite a lot, about civility and its requirements.They take it personally when
things don’t go well, they insist on making their point, defending their view, not letting
some behaviours they fiercely disapprove go without protesting or being one way or
another informally sanctioned (Ogien 1990).
16 The  frequency  and  the  intensity  of  conflicts,  whether  taking place  in  public
transportation, streets, or queues, shows three things. First, not everyone agrees on what
are the rules that matter most, how they should be interpreted (that is understood and
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performed5), and which shall prevail in such or such a situation. Second, the commonly
admitted distinction between civil and uncivil people does not stand. Observations and
interviews show that the same people continuously go from respecting to not respecting
rules, according to the circumstances.  And of  course,  what  is  perceived as  a  sign of
disdain when seen in others’ behaviours is not when applied to one’s own. As Katz showed
regarding “pissed off  drivers” (Katz 1999),  people are prompt to perceive the others’
behaviours as symptomatic of a lack of respect or education, but rarely consider their
own breach of the rule as representative of a general attitude towards rules or towards
the others. Third, the great number of fights proves that maintaining face is not always
what people care most about, even in public settings. They sometimes choose to endanger
their face and waste time, just to be able to make their point about what they think is
right or fair.
17 The strength of the emotions incurred in civil interactions is quite remarkable in itself.
All the more so as people do not seem to make sense of their own emotions. Indeed,
within  situations  or  afterwards,  they  often  blame  themselves  for  reacting  in
disproportionate ways. They cannot seem to understand why they react so intensely, so
vividly, to situations or conduct that “should not really matter,” since they involve people
that  “they  will  never  see  again.”6 Everything  seems  to  contribute  to  make  civil
interactions  negligible,  insignificant.  They  are  fleeting  relationships  with  unknown
people. They are  said  to  produce  nothing,  and people  consider  they  are  not  “really
themselves anyway,” since they are anonymous shadowy presences.
18 That is why these feelings are sometimes difficult to explain. People describe themselves
as “irrational” for caring so much about these situations, but as researchers we have to
give this widely observable phenomenon credit for its rationality. The rationality of these
emotions relies upon this articulation between facts and ideas, conduct and principles.
People  care  for  appearances  because  they  tell  them  something.  Even  though  this
connection can be manipulated, it remains essential to our lives and our perceptions of
each other’s conduct.
19 Civil rules and codes are often said to be superficial and merely functional, enabling us to
pass by, minding one’s own business. But people prove to be fiercely attached to what
they actually express when things do not go as they think they should.  They become
angry,  even  though  they  sometimes  forgo  rationality  for  the  sake  of  these  violent
emotions. Why do we feel so angry about it since “it does not matter,” because, “what
does it change, five more minutes of waiting?” It is obvious that what is at stake is a
sensible, situated, and embodied definition (perception) of what one’s responsibility towards others
and  the  world  understood  as  something  people  share  is. Civil  interactions  put  matters  of
principle into play. People put trust in conduct to express what they think. Hence the
importance of sentences heard during quarrels, such as: “who do you think you are?,”
“you cannot think you can behave like that and take away with it.” What is at stake is
what people think they can do in public, with and among others. Conduct is perceived and
understood  as  interpretations  and  illustrations  of  how  people  position  themselves
towards others. In these situations, the connection between the conduct and what it is
supposed to mean in a historically and conventionally established sense is taken very
seriously. This very link is the only thing that enables the possibility of a lie, that is, of a
secondary disconnection between meaning and signs, an instrumentalization of the signs
aimed to express something other than what they usually mean, or are supposed to mean
– for example, being nice and helpful in order to steal an elderly lady’s handbag.
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20 Since Goffman, sociologists have habitually recognized and emphasized the efforts made
by  people  in  public  to  behave  properly,  save  face,  appear  ‘normal,’  be  reliable  and
predictable, not raise attention, go unnoticed. They have also habitually distinguished
between what people show, the tribute they pay to the interaction order and on the other
hand,  what  they really  think or  feel.  Sociologists  should,  Goffman suggests,  consider
seriously what is done independently of what is really thought. But in this idea of what
people expect us to do we may lose sight of what we want to do.
 
Civility as an Activity of Defining What We Owe One
Another and What We Can Do With and Among Others
in Public
21 Ethnography shows civility is an activity through which people actually work hard on
trying to combine, compose, and make coherent the two dimensions of the public, that is,
anticipation of the judgement of others and affirmation of what it is worth from a first
person perspective. It is an activity of defining how to behave properly and fairly with
and among others. People try to recognize what can be done and what has to be done,
that is, customs and sense of justice. They behave according to social conventions but
they also try, sometimes with difficulty, to promote what they think is fair and good, and
even go against what is said to prevail in the micro-order of public interactions (face).
Then people experience trouble, unease, and perplexity. They feel puzzled, they discuss,
investigate. They do not always prefer to save face, “remain negligible” (Goffman 1971),
save “normal appearances” and let go. When applying so-called ‘codes,’ people express
what they think is fair through them. They select, twist, insist, modulate, in other words,
they make efforts  to make the codes reflect  the actual  feelings they have towards a
situation and its other participants.
22 In  other  words,  people  rely  upon  customs  and  habits  and  rules  and  categories  of
perception that are socially constituted, but this does not mean that these rules or habits
or customs are fake, superficial, and untrue. In most cases, people share this mainstream
sociological idea that rules of civility are “just codes.” Hence they are said not to really
express what people actually think, or feel “inside.” Yet this opposition becomes much
less obvious when one looks closer, taking into consideration the way people react when
they are not given the amount of respect they expect and think they deserve. People do
perceive that what is expressed through civil conduct actually means something, and they
care very much about this ‘something.’
23 When civility is  reconsidered,  the idea of  what is  ‘civil’  or  what ‘respect’  is  must be
conceived at a distance from Durkheim’s models of the sacred (Durkheim 2003), a loaded
model  that  Goffman in  turn used  extensively.  Indeed,  the  religious  model,  in  all  its
prestige, confines the relationship with respect within a binary apprehension. Faced with
something sacred, defined by the fact of being both separate and forbidden, there are
only  two  possible  stances:  conformation  or  transgression  (which  is  profanation).
Inaccessibility thus imposes itself as its unavoidable reverse side. The proper, respectful,
distance is drawn on the basis of a space, which means absolutely out of reach. Thus
spatiality almost entirely represents the type of competency that is expected. To respect
is to remain outside, to refrain from touching, to keep back. Obedience to requirements
which are made commonplace in this manner, entirely subordinated to a wider use of the
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spatial  metaphor,  does  not  take  place  so  much  by  appropriation  or  by  the
accomplishment of a positive performance, as by an uncompromising form of reverent
withdrawal.  On  the  contrary,  thinking  about  the  acrobatics  of  consideration  is  an
invitation to conceive the undecided outlines of a third term which goes beyond the
choice between a conformism that is bogged down in passivity, and an audacity which
continuously  threatens  to  turn  into  aggressiveness.  Here  is  a  requirement  for  civil
exchange which is more ambitious than the mere absence of profanation allows one to
envisage.
24 When facing a beggar asking for help and a coin or two in the métro or in the street, when
someone seems to jump a queue, or just stands in the way when everyone hurries, what is
at  stake is  never simply rules.  People experience strong emotions (sympathy,  shame,
trust  or  suspicion,  anger)  and  are  conflicted  when  trying  to  define  how  to  behave
properly. They talk about it afterwards with friends and relatives. They read avidly about
these experiences in the press and in literature. Advertising also constantly refers to
these shared experiences of urban public life. But few scholars have acknowledged how
important these experiences of coexistence are in people’s lives from either a moral or a
political perspective. No academic attention has been paid to how people are tormented
for  some  time  about  some  incident  that  did  not  go  well,  and  become  angry  with
themselves thinking about what they should have said or done.
25 Contrary to what the common binary rule-perspective suggests, civility is often caught up
in tensions between several rules that have to be hierarchized, and several parallel risks,
or  potential  flaws  that  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  and  avoided,  that  is,
indifference or intrusion,  suspicion or candour and so on.  Of  course,  there are rules
defining ways and reasons (resources, small talk) to address one another or not in the
streets, but they are themselves judged and criticized, and that is why they change. In the
situations outlined above, what has to be defined, for practical purposes, in the situation
is what the civil link is and should be, and to what extent it entails solidarity or charity or
gallantry or mere indifference or even fear (between whom, on what conditions), and
what those actually mean, practically speaking.
26 When interviewed about how they perceive their interactions with beggars,7 people have
a whole collection of stories and of all the different attitudes and conduct they tried and
tested to face the problem. They have many stories about how they felt when they saw
this one __  nice because there was humour and sympathy __ or, on the contrary, how
awkward they felt facing the other one, with his aggressive tone. Or how appalling they
found  that  other  woman  walking  barefoot  with  her  baby  in  her  arms.  Therefore,
describing the civility rules that apply in public, such as “civil  inattention” (Goffman
1963), is not enough to understand what is at play there.
27 Another example is  that  of  gender relations in public.  Women’s experience of  urban
public  life  today  involves  equality  between  men  and  women  in  an  interesting  way
(Gardner 1995; Gayet-Viaud 2010). Is the gender criterion always relevant? When does it
become relevant? Sometimes it is seen as relevant for some, but not for others. Civility
deals with the capacity to decide the criteria through which we should orientate our
mutual conduct. When being talked to or offered unwanted help, how to answer correctly
is not a matter of rules only. One has to be attentive to the issues at stake, that is, not to
give false hope by receiving too well, or being too generous, not encouraging unwanted
gestures  or  disapproving  attitudes,  but  not  presuming  guilt  and  being  unfair  by
presuming that the help offered is fake, a way of initiating seduction.
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28 Yet another example is age, which, for instance, has long been a source of authority and
now it is less and less. Yet, a child is still considered very broadly as a kind of “public
good”  (Goffman  1971;  Cahill  2010;  Gayet-Viaud  2006),  that  is,  someone  for  whom
responsibility is partly shared by all the adults present. All situations in which people are
not sure what to do involve difficulty combining what is commonly accepted and what is
fair. Opposing appearance to reality or to forms or conventions is, therefore, misleading
and misses what is really at stake in civil interactions. Civil interactions test the meaning
of  concepts  and ideas  about  the  larger  society,  about  democracy  as  a  way  of  living
together. They test gender interactions, they test perception of poverty and boundaries
of charity, compassion and solidarity, through active situations.
 
Civility as an Experience
29 Given its ambivalent nature of being a constraint and a threat, but also a requirement to
honour, a means of democratic socialization, civility is one of the most common and yet
neglected public experiences. It has to do with meddling, intervening, talking, showing
care and attention, sometimes fighting, trying to teach things to others. It belongs to the
everyday tests and expressions of the common good:
Beneath the vocabulary and paradigm of ‘action,’ it points to an understanding of
citizenship as an experience,  that is,  something that is  more comprehensible in
terms of attention and perception, attachment and care, ordinary expressions of
what is valuable. (Diamond, 2001)
30 There is, of course, a whole range of possibilities from mechanical low-level civil activity
to committed engagement in a public interaction or a public scene in order to do what
one thinks is right. Not all interactions are plainly committed to and all of them do not
presuppose a lot of reflexive critical work, of course. But many of them do. We therefore
have  to  describe  those  variations  in  detail.  As  Pharo  (1985)  described,  civility
encompasses some forms of  active gestures,  directly interpretable in terms of  public
spirit. Pharo calls them “civil interventions,” and defines them as standing between the
explicitly “militant forms” of relating oneself to the Polis and some of the more implicit
forms of common good encompassed in ordinary more routinized practices of civility.
Civil interactions perform measured and limited forms of commitment and reflexivity
about those forms, their right content, extent. To what extent is it necessary, possible,
and desirable to intervene? How far should one go? The concrete and even material
circumstances of the situations may be decisive, of course. Not doing something does not
always  mean  not  caring,  it  can  also  mean  feeling  helpless  (Gayet-Viaud,  2010),  not
knowing what  to  do,  how to  do  the  right  thing.  It  actually  occurs  in  a  great  many
situations.
31 These  variations  of  civil  exchange  and  degrees  of  commitment  are  ways  of  being
concerned, of taking part in situations: in which we discover and defend what we owe one
another. At the opposite of a presentist perspective of the interaction order, they point to
a truly iterative process. The intervention takes place in a series of public situations that
matter as such, add to one another, where people answer a series of past occurrences
(Gayet-Viaud 2011b)  as  much as  to the present  situation,  or  even anticipate possible
future ones.8
32 Categorization  of  course  plays  a  big  part  in  this  process  of  accumulation  between
episodes. What people experience is not a generalized other but typified others.
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33 Civility has often been understood as involving settings presenting all the characteristics
of theatre, that is, unity of time, place, and action. The interaction order defines a set of
rules and requirements that come into play as though they were happening for the first
time. There is no real experience there to reflect upon because the requirements are pre-
existing and are not within reach of the participants/actors. People work hard to achieve
and perform their part of the play, to become competent as performers, and they can
become  progressively  socialized  in  this  way.  But  from  this  perspective  their  civil
interactions do not participate in an experience that goes beyond itself. The only horizon
is being a good performer. What ethnographic observation and interviews show, on the
contrary, is that people reflect upon how to be good in those situations too. They try and
behave in different ways, for example vis-à-vis beggars, they give to everyone they meet,
then they do not give any more, or maybe only to the one who is local to where they live.
And they have a story about how they think about it. Sometimes, they are in a hurry and
they do not think at all. Their practices can be routinized. They are not troubled all the
time by all the issues that arise in civil interactions. But they feel troubled much more
often than they will admit.
 
Categorization, and Reflexivity Towards Categories:
The Everyday Fabric of a Political and Moral Culture
Through Civility
In civil interactions, ordinary categorization (Jayyusi 2010) or typification (Schütz 1962;
1970) should not be considered merely as a resource but also as a theme of critique, and
even quarrel, which contributes to forming the citizen’s perception and opinion of the
world they live in. Indeed, categories of mutual perception are not only instruments for
perception and regulations of  conducts,  they also frequently become matters of  self-
reflection, discussion, anticipation, critique, and even conflict.  Many examples can be
given,  some  of  the  most  salient  politically  involve  definitions  of:  homelessness  and
begging,  racial  interactions  (Anderson  2011),  religious  interactions  (Tavory  2011),  or
gender interactions (Gardner 1995).
34 Following the attack on the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ offices in Paris in January 2015, people in the
streets and the métro became aware of things they previously did not notice. Some aspects
of situations  became  relevant  that  were  not  relevant  a  few  days  ago.  Everybody
mentioned the incident,  it  became a source of great interest.  People who looked like
Arabs  (most  Muslims in  France  come from North Africa)  were  looked at  differently,
became objects of suspicion: whilst everybody was expected to feel grief and ‘national
unity,’ people speaking in Arabic were frowned upon or looked at suspiciously. In a train,
on the day of the big march of solidarity for the victims on January 11, a woman with her
companion started to comment harshly about two men a few feet from them who were
talking in Arabic: “How dare they,” she mumbled with anger. Other people immediately
turned to see who had spoken in this way and stared with disapprobation. Her companion
then murmured to her and she stopped talking.
35 For a few weeks, people began talking more easily than usual of their perceptions of
others, and the possible implications of these perceptions for democracy. They were
prompted  to  evoke  them,  think  about  them,  condemn them.  Suddenly,  what  people
looked like mattered differently. One could hear people say in a crowded train: “Hey, be
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patient OK. With what’s been going on we don’t need to… OK….” It was not necessary to
spell  things  out.  What  was  shared  in  common  became  public,  both  clearly  and
discursively. People articulated what they cared about in their civil interactions and in
their public life, that is, the right not to be a suspect. the importance of trust between
strangers.
36 The same day of the march in the crowded train returning from Place de la Nation (line 2)
when  the  train  stopped  at  Pigalle,  we  heard  the  usual  public  transportation
announcement warning people of potential pick-pockets active in the station. Usually
such announcements seem relevant and normal. But that day it sounded inappropriate
and ridiculous. There was a huge spontaneous laugh in the carriage. It sounded like a
‘citizens’ laughter,’ expressing a sense of what related the people in this carriage, what
security was (really) about, suggesting what was the nature of the trust there and then,
between people.
37 These  two  last  examples  are  of  course  very  unusual,  related  to  exceptional  events.
Nevertheless, they show in a more visible way energies that are at work in more ordinary
times and situations. Because ordinary contexts do also bear this stake of ‘categorization
vigilance’:9 elderly  people  pay  attention  to  what  they  are  thought  of  as  a  category
accordingly for “the young.” Denouncing discrimination is a way of refusing the negative
implications  that  can be  brought  about  by some categories,  or  even refuse  the very
relevance of a given category in a given situation. Categories and the norms, values, and
qualities attached to them are an issue, a matter of reflection and even dispute. Hence:
“Be careful, or the lady is gonna think that young people are rude.” “Who do you think
you are?”10 People argue about what they think they are and what they think it means to
be older/a woman/a Muslim/a beggar, and so on. They argue about what it is to be older:
does it accompany authority? They argue about what is means to be a woman: does it
mean that men can talk to them and ask for their number randomly in the street? Does it
mean one has to be gallant and helpful? They argue about what it means to wear such or
such clothes, to speak a foreign language, or have an accent, or to speak loudly.
38 This ordinary work that people accomplish to orientate their conduct between strangers,
relying upon mutual perception and categorization, is essential to democratic life. For
categorization is work on norms. It is not only a resource for perceiving what the situation
is:  defining a problem is already halfway to answering it,  it  configures the questions
which a course of action should answer. When we see a child, a Rom, a thief, we do not see
the same thing. Our categories – young, elderly, men/women, homeless, Rom, Jewish, gay,
bourgeois – are tested and fought for. Their relevance, and their normative implications.
 
Is ‘Urban Public Space’ a Mere Metaphor? Trust
Between Strangers or Democracy as a Form of
Sociability in Everyday Life
39 A pragmatist  approach to  civility  reveals  the  flaws  of  the  dominant,  superficial  and
ritualistic definition of civility. Civility is not so much the virtue of (certain) people, not
even,  or  not  only,  the  quality  of (certain)  conducts,  as  an  activity  undertaken  by
everyone, taking place between people when they are among strangers to define what
they owe one another.11 Being strangers to one another is not an obstacle but the very
condition of civility, in its relation to hospitality. It does not have to be overcome. It is as
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strangers that we grant each other respect and trust. Through this routine activity, people
practically  define,  in  everyday  interactions,  what  it  means  to  be  a  co-citizen:  what
strangers can expect from one another, can ask each other,  how they can trust each
other, how they can perceive each other, what help they can expect from one another, or
what they should fear or suspect, and so on.
40 If democratic public spaces are often said to designate an abstract political space where
ideas are discussed and opinions are forged, as the Enlightenment philosophers called for,
or  as  Habermas  defined  it,  urban  public  space  could  be  seen  as  no  more  than  a
metaphorical use (and maybe an abusive re-reading) of the traditional concept (Joseph
2006; Genestier, Ouardi & Rennes 2009; Terzi & Tonnelat 2013). What makes public spaces
public?  Considering  civility  as  being  a  part  of  this  practical  accomplishment  of
democracy,  enables  us  to  rethink  the  link  between  urban  public  space,  everyday
experience, and democracy.
41 Such a link appears in the contemporary ethnography of urban civil interactions, where
the  two  dimensions  of  the  public  discussed  above  are  intertwined  and  elaborated
together through ordinary practices and conducts. But this link is also documented by
historians who studied the French Revolution and the growth of democratic public spaces
in  18th century  France,  showing that  the  diffusion of  new ideas,  of  critique,  spread
through cafés and salons, through the beginnings of a free press, and also took the form
of a new culture of sociability. Didn’t the famous ‘Sans Culottes’ try to create entirely new
forms  of  civility,  imposing  ‘tutoiement,’ demanding  that  everybody  call  each  other
‘Citizen’?
42 The most durable change took the form of an entirely new urban hospitality. People had,
for the first time, equal rights not only to talk or express their opinions, but also to be
there and to come and go, to take their place (Joseph 1998) without having to justify their
identity, who they were, or where they came from (Cottereau 1992). For the first time,
people were granted trust without having to prove that they could be trusted, by referring to
someone  being  a  warrant  for  them.  Civility  therefore  played  a  great  part  in  this
revolutionary change for democracy. It was a matter of giving people credit. It still is: in
case of uncertainty (which is very often the case between strangers), civility requires
giving credit and, as much as possible, allowing the benefit of the doubt as to what the
others’ intentions might be. People are presumed trustworthy. That is why urban public
spaces  and political  public  space  are  related more than metaphorically,  but  through
sociability.
43 Since the French Revolution, civility as an activity, has remained a way through which
people work on this same challenge, passing conventions through the requirements of
political principles such as equality, liberty, and fraternity. Forms of civility, therefore,
evolve, as are transformed relations between women and men, between classes, between
generations, between races, between religious beliefs or sexual orientations. Civility is an
activity in which all these questions, and issues are dealt with they appear in practice, are
expressed, and are sometimes fought for.
44 Civility embodies places and times, when people act towards one another as equal co-
citizens. Mickael Sandel’s What Money Can’t Buy (Sandel 2013) insists, quite rightly, on the
threat that the (re)importation of some private and merchant criteria into public places
and public services represents. It is of core importance for a democracy that there are
such times  and places  at  which  people  are  not  seen and treated  according  to  their
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conditions, or how much money they earn, but are treated as equals. The very sense of
being members of a community (of belonging to it and being an active part of it) depends
on this. What is relevant from a civil point of view are not the differences arising from a
personal  or  professional  perspective.  But  such  differences  can  encompass  physical
personal aspects. Some fragilities or some needs, in given situations, may be perceived as
justifying  specific  treatment.  All  this  is  tested  in  situations.  Legitimacy  is  the  last
criterion,  ever  at  work,  for  defining  what  civil  relations  are  like, what  they  should
accommodate, and what they should ignore. Rethinking civility as this everyday activity




45 Civility, when studied as an activity, proves to be one of the ways in which citizenship is
experienced. It allows one to test what goes with this kind of link. It has no background to
rely upon, except for the mere fact of being co-members in a political/moral community.
It displays the tensions between a given state of social expectations and habits, and a
vision of what those habits or facts should be. It represents a way of actually dealing with
these two dimensions in real life. Civility means a way of trying to define, from within
situations,  what should be done,  what can be done,  at  the very moment of  doing.  It
performs and exhibits a state of the art of democracy as a political and moral culture, and
at the same time shows how this process is always defining itself, always asking whether
the rules that are applied are legitimate, and trying to improve upon them. Not only do
sociologists or philosophers watch people acting and ask themselves what their conduct
and its evolutions mean. People themselves practice a ‘folk sociology’ all the time (Schütz
1962; Schütz 1970; Anderson 2011) the implications of which are crucial to democratic
life.  Civility is  one of  the spaces in which such silent,  under-observed,  and,  ordinary
politically-oriented work takes place.
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NOTES
1. Goffman’s dichotomy of appearances and authenticity has produced an ambiguous legacy. His
works have accomplished a great deal in establishing the importance of interactions, and draw
our  attention  to  what  people  do  in  situations  (their  activity  as  performers).  But  he  also
constantly  refuses  to  acknowledge  the  complex  relation  between  the  interaction  order,
appearances, and expressivity. Goffman repeatedly refuses to consider appearances as being real
and neglects the possible importance for people of making the impressions they foster coincide
with their actual feelings and thoughts. For example, in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life: “In
their capacity as performers, individuals will be concerned with maintaining the impression that
they are living up to the many standards by which they and their products are judged. Because
these standards are so numerous and so pervasive, the individuals who are performers dwell
more than we might think in a moral world. But, qua performers, individuals are concerned not
with the moral issue of realizing these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a
convincing  impression  that  these  standards  are  being  realized.  Our  activity,  then,  is  largely
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concerned with moral matters, but as performers we do not have a moral concern with them”
(Goffman 1959: 251).
2. This opposition also often takes the form of the classical opposition between the common and
the public (for example, Tassin 1990); or (as in Tassin & Murard 2006), an opposition between
what it means to be a member of a community (belonging) and what it means to act as a citizen
in this community. On the contrary, I try to describe and understand how those two “sides” of
the  social  lives  of  citizens  are  intertwined.  Studying  democracy  as  a  way  of  life  means
considering citizenship as an on-going experience (Bidet, Boutet, Chave, Le Mener & Gayet-Viaud
2015).
3. Of  course,  Goffman  and  Sacks  do  not  share  the  same  position  regarding  the  status  of
appearances (there is, for one thing, nothing such as a strategic actor in Sacks’ perspective). But
what is of interest for the present discussion is that both tend to underestimate how people
evaluate (and not only perform) the norms, how they judge the routines of everyday life in which
they have to fit, and how they criticize them or even try to transform them (through a criticism
on categories and their taken-for-granted attributes, for instance).
4. The  empirical  data  here  referred  to  was  gathered  in  an  ethnographic  research  study
conducted for my PhD in sociology at EHESS (Gayet-Viaud 2008). It took place in France, mainly
in  and  around  Paris,  then  in  Le  Havre,  between  2000  and  2006  (Gayet-Viaud  2008;  2011;
forthcoming).
5. As I argue elswhere (Gayet-Viaud 2011b), one of the problems raised in urban encounters is to
know when to understand the other’s conduct as a sign that they are not well-meaning or well-
educated,  given the fact that between strangers,  pessimistic interpretations can arise rapidly
(since people do not share common backgrounds with which to solidify their trust, but share an
experience of categories only) and when to maintain a credit of trust about them. This means,
more concretely, that when someone seems not to do what one would expect them to do (give up
their seat or respect the queue, for examples), how do we understand their behaviour, how do we
conduct the inquiry into their intentions without presuming them guilty? Observations of many
conflicts between strangers show that civil requirements cannot be treated as “rights” that can
just be claimed without causing trouble. When you claim civility as a right, you offend the one to
whom you address your claim, affirming their incompetence, their failure. This proves that part
of what is accomplished within civil interactions relies upon the fact that conduct displays and
exhibits a genuine attention to others, and a mutual trust, that goes with granting others the 
initiative of giving you what you expect from them, that is, the “giver” to the “receiver.”
6. Quotations here are all excerpts from my fieldwork observations and interviews.
7. That means not to ask people about civility in general, which easily gives way to media ready-
made opinions  about  its  supposed decline:  the  more  concrete  the  conversation is,  the  more
stories people have to tell, that show how much these experiences matter to them.
8. Experience is, as Dewey defined it (1968), this very process: when people acknowledge what
happens as a consequence of what they do or have done, when they learn from them or adapt to
them.  Experience  is  about  how  one’s  actions  transform  both  their  sensibility  and  their
understanding of the world around them, or rather, their knowledge that also and sometimes
firstly comes through sensibility.
9. ‘Categorization  vigilance’  is  the special  attention  people  pay  to  the  implications  of  the
categories through which they are perceived by the others.
10. Excerpts from field note journal.
11. ‘Stranger’  here  in  the  sense  of  Simmel  1908  and Lofland 1973,  meaning people  who are
unacquainted.
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ABSTRACTS
By taking seriously the idea that democracy is a way of life, a pragmatist approach to democracy
invites us to reconsider how manners and the political realm of free thought may be related. The
present contribution argues that civil interactions are part of the experience of citizenship and
represent one of the ways through which political principles can come to life. Civility is therefore
described as an activity rather than a set of rules, the role of which in democratic life has been
often  underestimated.  In  civil  interactions,  people  struggle  and  hesitate,  and  even  fight  to
establish conditions of respect, trust, solidarity, or authority. They practically define the bond
between people who have nothing more in common than living in the same society. Far from
being a mere mechanical or conservative repetition of inherited habits, civil interactions, when
studied closely, exhibit the constant effort people make to promote what they care about. Civility
should  therefore  be  considered  as  an  activity  the  difficulties  associated  with  which  aim  at
embodying  through  sociability,  the  political  link  between  citizens.  Hospitality  to  difference,
helpfulness, attention to others, even quarrels over what is fair, discussions and reflections about
the relevance of the categories through which people perceive one another, have to be analysed
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